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ABSTRACT Within the literature on the evaluation of health (policy) interventions,
complexity is a much-debated issue. In particular, many claim that so-called ‘complex
interventions’ pose different challenges to evaluation studies than apparently ‘simple
interventions’ do. Distinct ways of doing evaluation entail particular ontologies and
epistemologies of complexity. They differ in terms of whether they define complexity as
a quantitative trait of interventions, whether they see evaluation as part of or outside
the intervention, and whether complexity can be regarded as an emergent property of
the intervention and its evaluation. In practice, evaluators and commissioners of large
health care improvement programmes rely on different, sometimes contradictory,
repertoires about what it means to conduct a ‘good’ evaluation. This is an ongoing
matter negotiated between and among commissioners, researchers, and—sometimes—
programme managers. In particular, notions of evaluability, usefulness and distance/
independence are problematised in different ways and with diverse consequences,
which, in turn, produce other notions and layers of complexity such as temporal,
institutional and affective complexities. When (social science) researchers claim that
one method or another is better able to grasp complexity, they elide the issue that any
methodological choice emphasises some complexities and lets others fade into the
background. Analysing the practicalities and emotions involved in evaluation studies
opens up the notion of complexity to analytical scrutiny, and suggests a basis for
co-theorising between biomedical, public health and social scientists (including Science
and Technology Studies scholars).
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Introduction
Within the literature on the evaluation of health (policy) interventions, complexity
is a much-debated issue. In particular, many authors claim that so-called ‘complex
interventions’ pose different challenges to evaluation studies than apparently
‘simple interventions’ do. In guidelines for conducting randomised controlled
trials (RCTs) on complex interventions in health care and public health, the
UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC) defined complex interventions as those
that address ‘behaviours, parameters of behaviours (e.g., frequency, timing),
and methods of organising and delivering those behaviours (e.g., type(s) of prac-
titioner, setting and location)’ (Medical Research Council, 2000, p. 2). While
influential, this is but one definition of what complex interventions are. Various
authors have sought to define them, and debates continue regarding how the ‘com-
plexity’ of such interventions can be conceptualised. In turn, discussions ensue
regarding what such definitions and conceptualisations imply for the conduct of
evaluation studies (i.e. studies investigating the implementation, processes and
results/effectiveness of the interventions) (cf. Bonell et al., 2013; Marchal
et al., 2013).
To elucidate notions of complexity in evaluation literature and practices, we
report here on an analysis of literature on evaluating complex interventions and,
furthermore, draw on qualitative data regarding the experiences with evaluation
studies of six health policy interventions. Recognising and developing the work
in this area by scholars such as Cohn et al. (2013) and Salisbury et al. (2011),
we study practical challenges involved in complex interventions and their evalu-
ation, reflecting on the kinds of complexities that are configured in the process.
Our research questions are twofold: (1) What (notions of) complexities underlie
and are significant for different means of evaluating complex interventions? (2)
What issues are salient for actors involved in the evaluation process, and at
what point(s)? In addressing these questions, we do not seek to ‘take sides’ in
debates about interventions, evaluation and complexity. Rather, we intend to par-
ticipate in discussions about complexity by elucidating some of the issues and
dilemmas that emerge from the literature on and practice of evaluation studies.
In the next two sections, we discuss our analytical perspectives and methods.
Then, in the first section of the results, we analyse some of the explicit and
implied definitions and uses of ‘complexity’ within the trials and evaluation litera-
ture. In doing so, some of the epistemological and normative stances that underpin
them are elucidated (and which are sometimes overtly discussed by scholars in this
field). Following this, we shift to analysing how complexity figured within the talk
and practice of evaluations in discursive arenas distinct from the more ‘hygienic’
2 T. Broer et al.
world of journal articles. In particular, we discuss three problematisations of issues
that are seen as salient in evaluation practices, and discuss how these produce
certain forms and layers of complexity. The paper concludes with reflections on
the consequences of this analysis for doing complexity in evaluation studies,
and what roles Science and Technology Studies (STS) might play in interrogations
and articulations of complexity.
Analytical Perspectives
In analysing complexity, we draw on two different approaches STS scholars have
adopted in theorising complexity.1 The first comes from Arribas-Ayllon et al.
(2010), who discursively analyse scientific articles on psychiatric genetics.
Arribas-Ayllon and colleagues follow how the word ‘complex’ is employed
within this literature and what functions it has. They go on to show how, within
the biomedical world of interventions and evaluations, the word ‘complex’ is
not only used to describe the phenomenon under examination—it functions too
as a sort of ‘plot’ that frames (and accounts for) research. This includes possible
failures to properly understand the phenomenon (i.e. because it is ‘complex’), as
well as providing hope for future research (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010).
Second, we draw on ideas posed by Mol and Law (2002), according to whom a
definitional utterance about the nature of complexity is exactly the moment where
complexity gets lost. For these authors,
Things add up and they don’t. They flow in linear time and they don’t. And
they exist within a single space and escape from it. That which is complex
cannot be pinned down. To pin it down is to lose it. (Mol and Law, 2002,
p. 20; emphasis in original)
The opacity of this definition of complexity is, perhaps, precisely intended. Mol
and Law go on to argue that questions about whether to accept simplifications
or more complex understandings of, and ways of interacting with, the world
should not really be of concern. Rather, it is ‘a matter of determining which sim-
plification or simplifications we will attend to and create and, as we do this, of
attending to what they foreground and draw our attention to, as well as what
they relegate to the background’ (Mol and Law, 2002, p. 20; emphasis in original).
This perspective inspires us to avoid solely describing what models of complex
interventions are (deemed) ‘best’, and enjoins us to distinguish between different
modes of ‘doing good evaluation’ (cf. Pols, 2003), considering what kinds of
complexities different designs and positions (within evaluation literature and prac-
tices) emphasise, and which are relegated to the background. Of course, we are all
too aware that we do not have a ‘view from nowhere’ (Haraway, 1988), and that
our analysis will itself entail certain simplifications and relegations, in part to try
and present a coherent story about a diverse set of practices (Pickersgill, 2013).2
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We draw here too on the work of Fitzgerald and Callard (2014; see, relatedly,
Fitzgerald et al., 2014). They call for an experimental approach to collaboration
and co-theorising between, in their case, social scientists and neuroscientists,
and we use their approach to think through what it means to co-theorise the
notion of complexity with the people involved in healthcare interventions and
evaluations.
While taking cues from writers such as Arribas-Ayllon, Mol and Law, and the
larger literatures they emerge from and talk to (e.g. Actor Network Theory (Law,
1999)), we also divert from these approaches to complexity in some ways. In con-
trast to Arribas-Ayllon and colleagues (2010) we are not exclusively following the
use of complexity (i.e. treating it as an actors’ category) but we also use it as an
analyst’s category, taking seriously the notion that certain situations are indeed
‘complex’, in the sense that they generate practical, cognitive and affective dilem-
mas for practitioners. In effect, our ontological imaginary is somewhat more
performative than that constituting the explicitly constructivist analysis of
Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2010), which thus places us closer to Mol and Law. In
sum, our approach is to interrogate how particular issues arising in evaluation
studies and the strategies employed to deal with these issues embody and lead
to different notions and layers of complexity.
Following Foucault, social scientists have shown how the way an issue is
defined also has consequences for what strategies are chosen to deal with it,
with the term ‘problematisation’ used to refer to the twinned process of defining
and tackling problems (e.g. Callon, 1986). The notion of problematisation is
closely linked to both ontology and epistemology, as many social scientists
have shown. In fact, it could be argued that problematisation interweaves the
two, as a problematisation combines a problem definition and the strategies
used to deal with the problem (or strategies to get to know the problem, i.e. epis-
temology) (Callon, 1986; Pickersgill, 2011; Neyland and Milyaeva, 2016). For
Foucault (as Lemke (2011, p. 32) has argued), problematisation (e.g. of
madness or sexuality) is both an actor’s and an analyst’s category: the emergence
and conditions of existence of particular problematisations can be studied, but at
the same time the observer too engages in this process of problematisation.
In analysing the issues arising in evaluation studies, including the strategies
employed to deal with these issues, we draw on the notion of ‘problematisation’.
We do so to theorise both the ontological and epistemological notions of complex-
ity, within the literature on evaluation studies of complex interventions and in
evaluation practices themselves. In evaluation studies of complex interventions,
problematisations of salient issues in evaluation practices produce different ver-
sions of complexity that may or may not be similar to those found in the literature
on evaluating complex interventions. Through our analysis of complexities within
both scientific articles and in practice, we seek to cast fresh light on some of the
variety of epistemologies and ontologies of complexity relating to problematisa-
tions that occur when scholars debate and evaluate ‘complex interventions’.
4 T. Broer et al.
Methods
Our study consists of two parts. First, we examined reports and articles on how to
evaluate complex interventions. These involved discussion articles, guideline
reports and actual evaluation studies. We attended especially to documents pro-
duced by the UK MRC and the US Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ) since these are two dominant groups in the health care evaluation
field. From there we snowballed through the literature, exploring also perspectives
differing from more ‘traditional’ experimental designs. Our key search terms
included ‘evaluation’, ‘evaluation study’ and ‘complex interventions’. We also
asked groups researching complex interventions for relevant literature. Moreover,
we looked in key journals to search for ongoing debates.
We tried to cover the range of positions possible in the debate on evaluation
studies of complex interventions in health care without aiming for a full review
within those positions. Each of the evaluation designs implicitly or explicitly
holds a view on what complexity means (ontology) and how it can be captured
in the best way (epistemology), and ascertaining these perspectives has been
our main focus during the analysis: that is, the identification of different ways
of constructing and producing ‘complexity’. While most of the reports and articles
mention the term ‘complex evaluations’ explicitly, sometimes ‘complexity’ was
an implicit notion rather than an explicit one. In those cases, we sought to
deduce from the way these articles talked about health care interventions/pro-
grammes their stance towards complexity, where complexity can then be seen
more as our analyst’s category rather than an actor’s category per se.
Analysis of Six Evaluation Studies
Secondly, we qualitatively examined evaluation studies associated with six large
improvement programmes in different health care settings carried out in the Neth-
erlands between 2005 and 2011. We deliberately chose to focus on rather diverse
programmes, in order to capture possible variety in problematisations of complex-
ity: the programmes differed in terms of their size, how many projects were part of
them, how they were initiated, and what health care sector(s) they addressed (e.g.
hospitals, mental health and nursing homes). The programmes were led by differ-
ent organisations as well, generally ones specialising in implementing improve-
ment programmes in the specific sector targeted.
The evaluation studies accompanying these programmes also varied, and they
were conducted by different (research) organisations. Some of the evaluating
teams worked at universities, but others worked in consultancies or research
organisations specifically doing research studies for policy (which we refer to in
this article, for reasons of clarity and continuity, as academic versus applied eva-
luators—even though we note that these terms are not mutually exclusive or
unproblematic). Most used a mixed methods design, involving both quantitative
Problematisations of Complexity 5
and qualitative methods, except for one that featured solely a qualitative process
evaluation (for an overview of the evaluations, see Øvretveit and Klazinga, 2012).
The programmes and evaluation studies were all commissioned by ZonMw, the
Netherlands organisation for health research and development. A selection cri-
terion was that the evaluation studies should have been recently finished at the
time we started our study, so that we could also incorporate experiences with
the final reports of the evaluation studies, how they were received, and how differ-
ent actors looked back on the evaluation studies.
To investigate experiences with evaluation, interviews were conducted with
five project leaders of evaluation studies (working at different sorts of research
organisations or at universities) and four study commissioners (all working at
ZonMw), as well as with one performer of the interventions. Broer conducted
the interviews between July 2011 and April 2012, asking about the respondents’
experiences with the evaluation study, contact with other actors involved, and
what they would have (wanted to be) done differently next time. In preparing
for the interviews (and in order to contextualise the analysis), Broer read and
analysed the reports of the evaluation studies, and, when relevant, adjustments
to the topic guide were made to reflect the particularities of the respondent’s
context. Generally, however, the topic lists used were the same per interview.
In addition to the interviews, Broer and Bal convened a focus group with 12
ZonMw-commissioners of evaluation studies, to explore their experiences with
(commissioning) evaluation studies and with aligning the programmes and the
accompanying evaluation studies.
Broer and Bal were both involved in one of the evaluation studies that incor-
porated within the dataset, and these experiences informed the analysis. More
specifically, they were involved in an evaluation study of the programme ‘Care
for Better’, which focused on long-term health care, such as care in nursing
homes and long-term mental health care. The evaluation study was conducted
by a larger team, consisting of both quantitative and qualitative researchers. As
part of the evaluation study, Broer and Bal met occasionally with the commis-
sioners of the evaluation study, and conducted participant observation of two of
these meetings, taking detailed notes that were written up immediately following
them. Furthermore, the commissioner of the evaluation study (ZonMw) also
organised meetings among researchers and commissioners of all the large
improvement programmes that ZonMw commissioned and observation were
undertaken of these meetings too. The meetings were held twice a year over a
period of five years, and all were observed.
All interviews and parts of the focus group session were recorded with
permission, transcribed and coded. Detailed notes were also taken during the
focus group. Draft texts of the analysis were then circulated and discussed with
both evaluators and commissioners for member check and to get additional
input. All respondents consented to the interviews, the focus group and the
observations.
6 T. Broer et al.
In our analysis, we focus on three problematisations of issues that arose for eva-
luators and commissioners of evaluation studies, highlighting their different per-
spectives and (how they accounted for) the choices that they made. In the
conclusion, we come back to how these different problematisations relate to
different kinds and notions of complexity, including those we located within the
literature. It is to the different notions of complexity within writings on (evaluation
studies of) complex interventions that we now turn.
Empirical Analysis
The Complications of Complexity
The MRC is one of the key sponsors of biomedical research in the UK; it is part of,
and contributes to, an international tradition in which experimental designs are
seen to provide the best evidence for interventions (Timmermans and Berg,
2003). The MRC is a major proponent of complex interventions, producing docu-
ments that have had impact far beyond the shores of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Campbell et al., 2007). Cohn et al. (2013) note how this organisation
was one of the first funders to address contemporary health care interventions
as ‘complex’, described as ‘involving overlapping modes of operation, and
hence challenging any straightforward measurement or evaluation of their
impact’ (p. 40). They connect this interest in and rise of complex interventions
to the need for health services to change social and biological factors simul-
taneously, relating to a rise in chronic conditions (Cohn et al., 2013). While the
title of the MRC’s 2000 ‘framework’ referred explicitly to RCT’s, this reference
was dropped in the title of its 2008 ‘guidance’ since the organisation was aware of
the impossibility or undesirability of RCT’s in some circumstances (MRC, 2008;
Cohn et al., 2013). However, even though the MRC acknowledged other possibi-
lities, it still argued in favour of experimental studies, and for RCT’s to be con-
ducted wherever feasible.
Another key advocate for complex interventions is the US AHRQ. Many of the
articles published under its aegis draw on a social scientific framework within
which the role of theory in evaluating interventions has an important place (Foy
et al., 2011). At the same time, the organisation asserts: ‘rigorous experimental
or quasi-experimental methods are still required to draw conclusions about effec-
tiveness’ (p. 456). These should be complemented by process evaluations asses-
sing ‘the intended and unintended changes in processes that may affect
outcomes’ (Foy et al., 2011, p. 456). Hence, while the AHRQ takes a slightly
different approach from the MRC (i.e. it draws on social scientific rather than
solely biomedical theory in evaluating interventions), both organisations place
an epistemological premium on experimental designs.
In both cases, an understanding of complexity as quantifiable is inherent to the
formal articulation of what a complex intervention is. The MRC, for example,
Problematisations of Complexity 7
defines complex interventions as comprising several countable characteristics: the
number of interacting components (i.e. behaviours, variables, outcomes, etc.), the
number and complexity of behaviours of actors, the number of target groups for
the intervention, the number and variability of trial outcomes and the degree of
flexibility in trial design permitted (Craig et al., 2008, p. 979). Hence, the charac-
teristics constituting the degree of complexity can be closely defined and
measured. Accordingly, like (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010), we argue that here
‘complexity is (viewed as) merely a quantitative increase in “complicatedness”’
(p. 500), rendering it as the (quantifiable) mirror image of ‘simplicity’.
Complex interventions are sometimes also thought of as representing a ‘para-
digm-shift: a Kuhnian revolution in which linear and reductionist tools and
methods are replaced by non-linear and dynamic counterparts that are capable
of grasping complex objects’ (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010). The relatively
recent development of ‘realist reviews’ as a means of evaluating complex inter-
ventions casts light on the degree to which complex interventions are framed as
innovative (i.e. since the innovative nature of complex interventions is regarded
as necessitating innovation in the means by which they are evaluated). Realist
reviews of healthcare interventions have been proposed and developed by a
group of UK social policy and healthcare researchers and have been adopted
widely (Pawson et al., 2005). Realist review has, according to its proponents,
no preference for quantitative or qualitative methods, but, rather, sees ‘merit
in multiple methods’ (Pawson et al., 2005, p. 22). Indeed, realist reviews
themselves can be considered as part of the wider evidentiary paradigm shift
within which complex interventions are often positioned by investigators and
commentators.
Realist reviewers have described the realist method as entailing a change in the
question that an evaluation addresses: ‘Under realism, the basic evaluative ques-
tion—what works?—changes to “what is it about this programme that works for
whom in what circumstances?”’ (Pawson et al., 2005, p. 22) This more closely
specified and contextualised question is understood to refocus evaluative goals
from judgement to explanation. In doing so, realist reviewers seek to overcome
some of the problems regarded as emerging as a consequence of the application
of experimental research methods to ascertain the effects of an intervention
(Pawson et al., 2005; Greenhalgh et al., 2009). Advocates argue that ‘large-
scale, whole-systems interventions in health care require imaginative approaches
to evaluation that go beyond assessing progress against predefined goals and mile-
stones’ (Greenhalgh et al., 2009, p. 391). In realist review, the triplet ‘context,
mechanism and outcome’ is often used in order to evaluate an intervention.
Indeed, ‘[r]ealist review seeks to uncover the underlying theories that explain
these demiregularities [in which human beings generally make similar choices
in relatively similar contexts] by critically scrutinising the interaction between
context, mechanism and outcome’ (Wong et al., 2010, p. 15). Furthermore, by
asking ‘what works for whom’, realist reviewers take seriously the views and
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practices of practitioners in defining and dealing with complexity in specific pro-
grammes (Greenhalgh et al., 2009).
In the process of undertaking a realist review, seven defining features of
complex interventions are outlined, including that they work through the
choices of stakeholders, have non-linear implementation chains, and are shaped
according to specific contexts (Pawson et al., 2005). By addressing these features,
realist evaluation seeks to produce rich descriptions of the different mechanisms
leading to change without assuming a linear and causal relationship between
the mechanism and (positive) outcomes. In a sense, it is precisely the inability
to quantify all relevant factors in an intervention that seems to constitute the ‘com-
plexity’ here. Moreover, as realist evaluators suggest that the nature of the inter-
vention only becomes clear in its development, the (number of) components to it
can only be settled retrospectively.
Others argue that evaluation itself is an element that can make interventions
complex. Within this proposition, which in fact pre-dates the idiom of complex
interventions, an understanding of evaluation as a neutral entity positioned
outside the intervention is refused. Authors such as Guba and Lincoln (1989)
and Abma (2005, 2006) frequently criticise overtly instrumentalised forms of
evaluation, especially when undertaken at the behest of policy-makers. By align-
ing with policy objectives and evaluating a programme in terms of whether these
are met, the truth (and the complexity) of the intervention is taken to be defined in
a singular way—other means of understanding and speaking about ‘effectiveness’,
for instance, are deleted.
Based on this criticism, different sorts of evaluation studies have been increas-
ingly employed since the late 1980s, such as fourth generation evaluation (Guba
and Lincoln, 1989) and responsive evaluation (Abma, 2005, 2006). While such
approaches that resist instrumental uses (and, more generally, a strictly positivistic
view of knowledge production) have been used in evaluation studies of health care
interventions (as we will outline below), they are especially common in the field of
education (where there has traditionally been more room for approaches other than
experimental ones; Oakley, 2006). These evaluative studies share a constructionist
perspective, and evaluators investigate what the intervention means for, among
others, the clinicians and patients involved and how they did (or did not) use it.
The underlying rationale is that evaluators do not put forward their own truths,
but that facts are instead produced through dialogue between the different actors
engaged in a programme and its evaluation (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Mabry,
2002; Abma, 2005, 2006). Citizens (or, in health care, patients, among others)
are framed as relevant stakeholders and participate in the evaluation, such as by
contributing to its organising questions, helping to select participants, and
working with academics in the interpretation of findings (Guba and Lincoln,
1989). The complexity at stake here appears to be a property of the intertwinement
between the intervention and its evaluation, and the multiplicity of meanings, goals
and truths inherent within and constituted through the evaluation assemblage.
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Authors proposing so-called ‘formative evaluations’ seem to take the issue of
evaluators contributing to the intervention even more seriously. Implicitly,
many of the designs described above make a distinction between research and
policy: research is meant to inform policy-makers, or is understood as being
appropriate to conduct in isolation from political/policy goals. Another way in
which evaluation can be conceptualised, however, is as part of policy-making.
Formative evaluations—that is, evaluations that are formative to the interventions
studied as they are performed—are undertaken with this interpolation as an expli-
cit organising rationale.
As such, formative evaluations do not draw rigid boundaries between ‘interven-
tions’ and ‘research’. In more traditional experimental designs, intervening in the
eventual implementation might be problematic since the more the evaluation
impacts the intervention, the less valid the conclusions might be (Bate and
Robert, 2002). Within formative evaluations, on the other hand, it is argued
that, first, evaluation cannot be (entirely) distinct from the intervention it evalu-
ates, since the evaluation will always have a certain impact, and, second, evalu-
ation should ideally contribute to the intervention programme along the way
since it would be ‘ironic’ to carry out a ‘non-learning evaluation of a learning pro-
gramme’ (Bate and Robert, 2002, p. 974). Accordingly, proponents plea for for-
mative evaluations within which the emerging results of the evaluation are used
immediately for informing programme change (Øvretveit, 2009; Zuiderent-
Jerak et al., 2009). It appears that ‘complexity’ in formative evaluation can be
understood as emerging from the ambiguous and intertwining ontologies of
‘policy’, ‘intervention’ and ‘research’, and the performative approach to evalu-
ation necessitated by this comprehension of experimentality (cf. Pickering,
2002, 2010).
As we have seen, a range of understandings of complexity inhere within, associ-
ate with, and are articulated and produced through biomedical and social science
discourses on so-called ‘complex interventions’ and their evaluations. These differ
in terms of whether they define complexity as a quantitative trait of interventions,
whether they see evaluation as part of or outside the intervention, and whether
complexity can be regarded as an emergent property. In the next section, we
analyse experiences with evaluation studies of six different improvement pro-
grammes (which are generally seen as complex interventions) and, in particular,
describe three problematisations in evaluating complex interventions. We then
reflect on the similarities and differences between accounts in the literature and
accounts from our interviews and what those mean for notions of complexity.
Our analysis treats the different problematisations in terms of their conceptualis-
ation and constitution of complexity within evaluation practices. Each problema-
tisation does not relate to one particular form of complexity as such; rather, the
specific ways in which problems get defined and dealt with respond to and
produce different kinds of complexities.
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Problematising Evaluability
As described in the methods section, we studied six evaluation studies of large
‘quality improvement programmes’ in the Netherlands. While these programmes
were not generally referred to as ‘complex interventions’, this term was frequently
mentioned in meetings between evaluators and commissioners, and the architec-
ture of the programmes corresponded with existing accounts of complex interven-
tions within the literature. The programmes were the first of their kind in the
Netherlands, and both evaluators and commissioners struggled with coming to
grips with this new ‘beast’ (as some evaluators sometimes referred to the pro-
grammes). The improvement programmes were nation-wide activities in which
up to hundreds of care organisations and teams participated, focused on several
processes (or subjects that were deemed in need of improvement, such as medi-
cation safety, fall prevention, etc.) in the organisations and at different organis-
ational ‘layers’. The programmes were also multifaceted in terms of the
‘interventions’ employed, with guidelines, consensus meetings, websites, advisors
to the organisations, national teams and many more part of the overall
programmes.
As we have seen, evaluation is a key component in complex interventions;
moreover, it is generally regarded as something that can be done well (or
badly). Accordingly, perhaps the most significant problematisation that we
deduced orientated around the question of how to make a programme ‘evaluable’.
People involved in evaluation studies of improvement programmes problematised
this issue in different ways, with various strategies discussed and deployed to deal
with it. While to some extent such strategies could be thought through at the start
of the evaluation, this matter seemed to be an ongoing evaluation question as well,
since study design is but one factor determining the strategies employed to make
the programmes ‘evaluable’. Hence, the problematisation of evaluability hap-
pened throughout the duration of evaluation studies.
One key aspect of making programmes evaluable concerned their goals.
Complex interventions, including the quality improvement programmes under
consideration here, are designed to meet specific goals, which are often framed
as ‘SMART’: Specific, Measurable, Actionable/Ambitious, Realistic and
Timely. Goals serve a double function: they are meant to encourage organisations
to participate and to be ambitious in their projects, and to convince policy-makers
of investing in them; also, they are used in project evaluations to judge the success
of a programme. Tensions can arise between the need for outward-facing bold and
ambitious goals, and a practical imperative for more mundane and easily measur-
able targets that will help the programme to be evaluated (and to do well in the
evaluation).
For the interventions and evaluations we examined, the usual strategy was to set
ambitious goals, but then ‘one builds in disappointment’, as a senior ZonMw
employee argued. Because goals were set that would excite people and attract
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organisations to the quality improvement programme, it meant that goals were
sometimes less realistic—and ultimately seldom met. Generally, the evaluations
concluded that such programmes were not as successful as expected.
In order to meet at least the majority of the goals, some ZonMw employees
moreover asserted that these should have been made more explicit from the pro-
gramme conception—echoing, therefore, the positions on evaluations set out by
the MRC (2008, p. 12) and AHRQ (cf. Foy et al., 2011). As one interviewee
working for ZonMw argued:
I think it is very important to think about the criteria for evaluation when
starting the programme. What aspects of the programme do you want to
have evaluated? And that also means that one should think about the pro-
gramme goals. What do you want to achieve? Because that is what you
want to be evaluated on. ( . . . ) In contrast to how it was mostly done: that
we thought about the criteria for evaluation halfway or towards the end of
the programme.3 (Senior programme manager, ZonMw)
Some of the evaluation studies indeed defined the goals and indicators for
improvement beforehand, and measured programme success on the basis of
these, aligning with the wishes of the ZonMw employee quoted above.
However, both evaluators and programme managers alike were hesitant about
this strategy of defining success on the basis of these predefined goals. One pro-
gramme manager—who led the overall programme ‘Care for Better’ of which
Broer and Bal acted as evaluators—was critical about the use of these goals for
the evaluation:
Well, I understand, you need to know: if you set a goal, is it met. But the
setting of the goal for us was a little . . . [makes a gesture with her hands to
indicate they were not thought through specifically for evaluation purposes]
If that then becomes such an important hook for the entire project. Setting a
goal is very difficult and when these [goals] then become what you will be
judged on in the end—that’s how it feels sometimes—then that’s not justified.
It makes me think: what is the value of this conclusion and is it actually
correct? [. . .] Also because the people [who are setting the goal] were very
ambitious at that time and wanted to get the funding for the project, so how
realistic is it [the goals]? (Senior Consultant/Researcher)
In other evaluation studies defining goals and indicators beforehand was seen as a
problem to start with, or even as not doable, because programmes and goals often
change during implementation. The programmes can become bigger, with parts
added; for example, the programme Broer and Bal evaluated began with seven
improvement projects but soon increased both the number of projects and the
sectors addressed (i.e. mental health care, in addition to the care of older
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adults). Such expansions can create difficulties and frustrations for evaluators. An
evaluator of a different programme said:
I am never going to do that again (. . .) [i.e. evaluate a programme that keeps
changing]. It has to be clear what the evaluation has to be, and it should not
be the case that we are submitting a proposal for a train that is already
moving and where new elements are constantly added to, so that we need
to develop new questionnaires and interviews and so on. (Head of Depart-
ment, Research organisation)
Further, teams in healthcare organisations performing the interventions might
have started working on some goals—yet, they later realised that they needed to
work on something else. An example here, of the evaluation Bal was involved
in, is of an improvement team that originally had the goal of decreasing the
number of reported safety errors (medication safety, falls, etc.), but they soon
decided that the ‘real’ problem was that most errors are not reported in the first
place. Accordingly, the goal changed to increasing the number of reported
errors (Zuiderent-Jerak et al., 2009). In contrast to the conventional logic of evalu-
ation, some researchers argued that programme goals should not be fixed before-
hand, but should be, to an extent, emergent. Such assertions resonated with some
of the literature on fourth generation evaluation discussed in the previous section
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989). At the very least, the respondents considered, there
should be facility for shifts and displacements in goals, and an evaluation frame-
work that allows for this should be employed.
In this respect, we detected two slightly different strategies that evaluators opted
for, sometimes even within the same evaluation. In some programmes, the
improvements on those goals the improvement teams themselves had set were
used by evaluators as measures of success, rather than or in addition to goals
the evaluators had predefined. As part of this strategy of staying close to what
improvement teams were doing, some researchers also used process evaluations
to describe and explain these goal displacements. As a second strategy,
outcome measures such as perceived effectiveness were also regarded as a way
of enabling teams to measure specific goals while still allowing for the evaluation
of their efforts on predefined measures. Hence, teams within the programmes were
still working on the issues that they found important while evaluators ensured that
the programmes were still ‘evaluable’—that is, that at least something was being
aimed towards, and that any progress made was measured.
Goal displacement not only needs flexibility on the part of researchers,
however, but also from research commissioners: study questions and methods
might change, so the knowledge ultimately produced might not accord with that
initially commissioned. As an organisation connecting research and policy,
ZonMw (i.e. the commissioner) itself has a range of aims, such as enhancing
knowledge, improving healthcare and connecting with government agendas.
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Reflecting on ZonMw’s goals, one ZonMw employee mentioned that evaluation
research can be seen as an evaluation of the work of ZonMw itself:
the simplest thing is that we want to evaluate our own work: have we done it
right? Have we done the right things and have we allocated the money in the
right way? Because we want the money to be spent in the right way to actu-
ally contribute to Dutch health care. (Head of Department, ZonMW)
This will towards institutional reflexivity—so characteristic of many private and
public bodies today (Giddens, 1991; Power, 1997; Dahler-Larsen, 2012)—
existed alongside other, sometimes more traditionally instrumental goals and
expectations. These included acquiring knowledge that the project researchers
and ZonMw could use to: (a) immediately improve the programme (as per
some of the literature on evaluation interrogated in the previous section); (b)
draw conclusions that could be taken into account in future decisions and pro-
grammes (a classic motivation underlying evaluation) and (c) understand better
what the programme had achieved (for the immediate sake of the organisation,
as well as to show others what societal benefits public investment in it has
afforded). Yet, although these different and sometimes contradicting aims of
ZonMw could lead to tensions both within and between evaluators and programme
managers, they also had the potential to give leeway for both sets of actors to
pursue their own paths.
In sum, making programmes evaluable entails goal setting and finding suitable
evaluation methods, and different ways of problematising evaluability of a pro-
gramme come with different ontologies and epistemologies of complexity (e.g.
questions come to asked regarding whether programmes should be seen as prede-
fined or emerging, with implications for how these different ontologies should be
captured in the evaluations). This is an ongoing process that requires flexibility on
the part of evaluators, commissioners and programme managers alike (and even
then can involve friction). The setting of goals sometimes creates ambivalence
between programmes and evaluations, as goals might have different meanings
and functions within these two practices, and must also resonate in some way
with the overarching (and varied) aims of ZonMw. The problematisation of
how to produce ‘an evaluable programme’ also entails and exhibits specific com-
plexities, such as practical, political and affective notions of complexity. Only
through grappling with the practicalities can any epistemological purchase be
found—the practicalities interact with, rather than merely follow from, different
kinds of complexity.
Emotions in this respect played a large role in how evaluations are practiced:
frustration, anger, unease and hope that it will all work out in the end. What,
when and how tensions and emotions came to the fore depended on the specific
evaluation strategy (and epistemological position) adopted. In more ‘traditional’,
MRC-style approaches based predominantly on a quantification of complexity, the
14 T. Broer et al.
programmes were seen as ‘moving targets’ and programme executors and evalua-
tors had to come to agreement over goals. Conversely, in more interventionist
approaches there was a constant tension (and ensuing epistemic and emotional
labour) in trying to define the precise goals of the programmes while remaining
accountable to outsiders/policy-makers. Our analysis here shows some resonances
with the kinds of emotions activated in the interdisciplinary work documented
by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2014), where diverse agendas and expertise are
likewise brought together—sometimes antagonistically—in order to produce
knowledge.
Problematising Usefulness
Another important issue for commissioners and researchers was how to produce
‘useful’ knowledge. For one thing, it was not obvious what ‘useful’ might mean
for the different actors involved. Roughly, among the evaluation studies we inves-
tigated, a distinction can be made between first, those conducted by more ‘applied’
evaluators, whose aim is to improve policy and services, and second, evaluations
carried out by academic research organisations. These distinctions are not always
clear-cut, however; for instance, academic evaluators can also have a practice-
orientated focus. Nevertheless, the former group usually gives fairly straightfor-
ward answers to questions regarding what is needed from an evaluation project
and for whom. Further, unlike academic researchers, their work is not explicitly
aimed at generating generalisable knowledge and rarely leads to (international)
publications.
As a consequence of its lack of ‘application’, the value of academically-
orientated evaluation was sometimes difficult to see from a ZonMw perspective.
As one senior ZonMw employee asked, rhetorically: ‘What do we benefit from an
article in the Journal of Anthropology?’ This illustrates a tension between two
different modes of ‘doing good evaluation’ (cf. Pols, 2003), and the diverging
epistemological and ontological biases, traditions and aims of different evaluators.
The more ‘applied’ evaluators seemed to align more closely with the goals of
ZonMw; for example, during a discussion at a meeting among commissioners
and our academic evaluation team, one of the commissioners sighed to us: ‘You
are making everything complex.’ Hence, ZonMw more frequently invited
‘applied’ research groups to conduct evaluations as those researchers are more
inclined to translate the evaluations into instrumental use. Yet, ZonMw was not
against international publications; in fact, these two different modes of doing
good evaluation were both described by ZonMw employees themselves.
Accordingly, ZonMw could be seen as conceptualising itself as a ‘boundary
organisation’, linking academic research and policy programme, and therefore
as an embodiment of the possible tensions that could arise between knowledge
production and application (Wehrens et al., 2014). Some ZonMw employees
said that it was often necessary to translate findings from the evaluation for
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policy and for the general public. For instance, in one of the programmes we were
involved in, the programme committee (comprising commissioners, healthcare
managers and policy actors) wanted to have 10 bullet-pointed ‘lessons learnt’
from the programme, whereas we did not feel able to translate our data into articul-
able lessons in the way desired. This was not just an argument about what we (as
evaluators) could do, but also about how responsibilities should be organised: we
indeed gave presentations with practical suggestions, but saw ZonMw as being
primarily responsible for translating this applicable knowledge further. Another
evaluator said that over the course of their evaluation they started writing more
readable and shorter reports, as was requested also by the programme committee
who wanted the reports to be more readily usable for them.
Such examples again illustrate how some evaluators differed from commis-
sioners (and policy actors) in terms of epistemological agendas and ontological
frameworks for comprehending the nature of data, and hence the possibility of
its purification (and the degree to which this could occur), enmeshed with a dis-
agreement about where responsibilities should and can lie. Bringing in ‘applied’
evaluators represented a (partial) solution for ZonMw, yet also compromised
their research goals where programmes were not just set up for implementation
but also to produce new knowledge (since ‘applied’ evaluators generally do not
focus on undertaking generalisable research). Hence, the production of useful
knowledge is more complicated—more complex—than just a straightforward
and instrumental matter of ascertaining whether or not the intervention ‘works’
and how the results were obtained.
Usefulness also had another angle. ZonMw respondents, for example, argued
that evaluation studies could be more useful when they took into account a pro-
gramme’s historical and policy context (an aspect which was, according to
them, usually absent in the evaluations). Assertions regarding the import of
context resonate with arguments advanced by realist evaluators: that is, since
the programmes are initiated from and are part of a policy context, this should
be taken into account in order to understand the programme properly and to be
able to make statements about the programme theories and underlying mechan-
isms (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). One senior ZonMw employee reflected about
an evaluation: ‘If we would have done it [designing the programme] in a different
way, would it have had different effects? We don’t know.’ The programmes dif-
fered in how they were set up and where the responsibility for improvements was
situated, as well as in terms of different policy and healthcare contexts; for at least
some in ZonMw, these differences were deemed relevant to understand in order to
ascertain how they might lead to variations in outcome (and, if so, what consti-
tuted the best set-up of a programme).
Policy contexts, however, are not static; they shift, change, evolve—they are
hard to pin down. They are ‘complex’. Given the temporal dimension to policy
contexts, the extent to which research is ‘useful’ relates also to its timing. Many
researchers note that the results of their work are only partly used by policy
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actors, if at all. This was perceived to be a consequence of the fact that when the
results become available, policy debates and goals have moved on, and/or new
programmes have started that do not take the results of the on-going evaluation
into account (see also: Øvretveit and Klazinga, 2012; Ettelt et al., 2015). The
role of ZonMw is, ostensibly, to mediate between policy and research
(cf. Lomas, 2000), but given the long duration of programmes—often four to
six years—this would require considerable consistency in the policy domain
(which is unlikely).
For instance, in one of the programmes studying new financial instruments to
stimulate integrated care, the specific intervention under evaluation was already
implemented on a national scale while the evaluation of the pilot was still under-
way. In the study Broer and Bal were involved in, it was found that the healthcare
domain in which the programme was implemented was so crowded with new pro-
grammes and initiatives that it was hard to keep up with policy developments. And
while ZonMw would make sure that policy-makers from the Ministry of Health
would participate in programme committees, and ZonMw leadership had
regular meetings with the Ministry as well, such attempts at coordination were cer-
tainly not always successful. Hence, the usefulness of knowledge depends on
making different time-frames and contexts (of policy, of evaluation studies, of
healthcare) align as well.
To summarise, like the construction of ‘evaluable’ programmes, ensuring that
programmes produce ‘useful’ knowledge is no simple matter. In particular, ques-
tions must be negotiated regarding useful to whom, and for what purposes, with
consequences for ontologies and epistemologies of complexity (i.e. the way ‘use-
fulness’ is defined also interacts with the way an evaluation is seen and carried out,
and thus with how ‘complex interventions’ themselves are perceived and pro-
duced). Further, the different temporalities of policy, research and evaluations
can limit the usefulness of knowledge generated. This especially is an issue that
neither evaluators nor commissioners are readily able to negotiate or plan for.
The overall effect is to produce a kind of knowledge that has utility within a
given timeframe, but also in a highly specific, largely undefinable, and hence
inherently complex context—and as the policy world continues to change this use-
fulness is disempowered.
One problematisation of usefulness occurs, in part, through ZonMw’s prefer-
ence for ‘applied’ evaluation—yet even these evaluators can falter when pro-
gramme goals (from which utility emerges) include the production of
generalisable knowledge. Moreover, they are powerless in the face of the unpre-
dictability of political decision-making that can swiftly alter the salient features of
the context within which they are situated. These different problematisations of
usefulness then involve different strategies in terms of aligning with the pro-
grammes, of allowing flexibility, or refusing such flexibility as that would
hamper knowledge production related to predefined goals or the need to
account for ZonMw investments. Such strategies also produced, and were part
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of a solution for, different notions and layers of complexity, for example, tem-
poral, contextual and institutional complexities.
Problematising Distance
The final problematisation emerging from our data relates to how involved or
distant evaluators should be in the programmes they are evaluating. Independence
is often deemed important (though not always possible), both from an evaluators’
and a policy perspective, and can be situated towards different actors and domains.
First, the research can be more or less independent from ZonMw. For ZonMw, this
is a crucial issue. ZonMw is not a neutral actor; at the very least, it has a stake in
the evaluation. One of the elements within the evaluation is whether or not
ZonMw commissioned the programmes and evaluation studies appropriately
and thus made the ‘right’ choices to improve Dutch healthcare, as one ZonMw
expressed it. This made it hard for ZonMw to then comment on an evaluation.
As the same ZonMw employee argued:
We can have the appearances against us, you know, when we say this [evalu-
ation] really ‘sucks’, because the researchers can use this against us and say
‘We have evaluated ZonMw and they put our evaluation aside’. That is a real
dilemma. (Head of Department, ZonMW)
Second, independence can relate to the connections between the improvement
practices and programme executers; here, independence is sometimes argued
for—and sometimes warned against. An illustrative example comes from one of
the programmes in which so-called ‘guiding research’ took place instead of a
formal evaluation. The idea was that this research immediately served the pro-
gramme instead of only evaluating it; for instance, feedback was given after
people involved in the programme were interviewed, and suggestions made
regarding how the programme could be improved. Thus, in this type of research,
‘closeness’ to practice is considered important, with evaluators regarded as having
roles to play in the improvement processes.
In contrast, some researchers pleaded for more ‘distant’ research. One senior
health services researcher and head of a research department ‘thought that you
somehow have to separate evaluation from implementation’, and argued that
not having such a (clear) separation might sometimes be detrimental to those
very improvement practices. In this evaluation study, intermediate reports were
written to conclude the year before and to enable the people involved to use the
findings for the next year—which would constitute a way of giving feedback
and thus a form of formative evaluation. However, the evaluators’ intermediate
reports were not always as positive as programme managers regarded the
results/programme to be. The evaluator we interviewed attributed the difference
of opinion to programme managers’ strategic use of affirmative tales of the
18 T. Broer et al.
programme as a means of keeping participants motivated. She wondered whether
the intermediate evaluation report would harm this strategy, and therefore ques-
tioned whether or not it was such a good idea to work with intermediate
reports. Hence, the complexities of individual and intra-group psychology (includ-
ing emotions like excitement and disappointment) were understood to shape the
effectiveness of different models of evaluation.
Another example from the same evaluation likewise foregrounded how particu-
lar affects could have practical effects. Here, the evaluator had a discussion with
the programme management group about what to do with improvement teams that
participated in the programme but for which no data was available. According to
the evaluators, not taking into account these teams would have led to inaccurate
conclusions (in this case, a higher success rate than reflected in the actual pro-
gramme) and therefore they argued for including these teams in the analysis.
The evaluator argued that if the evaluation team had been more involved, they
would have faced difficulties in pursuing their argument (i.e. they would have
felt personally reluctant) of also taking into account teams for which no data
was available. Otherwise, she argued, ‘one would perhaps make other decisions
that are more in the interest of the people involved in [the management of] the pro-
gramme’. In effect, distance resulted in objectivity: proximity might produce per-
sonal closeness, regarded here as having the potential to compromise the rigour of
the evaluation.
However, not all our respondents agreed with the conclusion that proximity led
to personal closeness, resulting in compromised objectivity. One researcher
argued that the more independent the research is, the more evaluators needed to
work on the relationships that they have with other parties in order to be clear
about their role, what they do, and what they do not do:
It is something that should be constantly on your mind. Independence in
relation to political parties and in relation to the care organisations; indepen-
dence plays a role on all levels. (. . .) Therefore it is important to be con-
stantly aware of it (. . .) by being very clear to others what your role is
(. . .). Always looking for the dialogue. (Senior Researcher, Research
organisation)
In this case, it was felt that by keeping close contact with all involved, enough
independence could be created to give a critical analysis of the results. Rather
than being distant or involved, a combination of the two is required, needing
much relationship work.
We can see, then, that in the same way as complexity is resistant to being under-
stood in practice as a binary issue, the question of whether evaluators should be
‘distant’ or ‘involved’ in the programmes they are evaluating likewise seems to
resist a straightforward answer.4 The ontologies and normativities of ‘distance’
and ‘involvement’ hence seem themselves to be ‘complex’. Accordingly, the
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question that occupies evaluators relates to how distant and/or involved they
should be—as well as when and with regards to whom and what. As with the
other problematisations, there are structural constraints operating to pre-discipline
the decision-making of evaluators, in ways that in some senses make this chal-
lenge easier to deal with: for example, whether or not the evaluation is ‘supposed’
to be (i.e. commissioned as) formative.
Yet, no matter how rigidly defined by commissioners evaluations are (and
indeed, there is not often a great deal of rigidity), evaluators still have considerable
interpretative flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) regarding to how they problema-
tise their involvement in and independence to the programme which is interwoven
with different ontologies and epistemologies of complexity. These problematisa-
tions are contingent, mutable through practice, and relate too to their personal
experiences of working with programme teams and to their understandings of
the epistemic effects of personal interactions as well as to how different actors
see and enact the different responsibilities involved. Again, as in previous sections
analysing evaluation practices, such personal interactions and emotions, as well as
the different temporalities involved, add new forms and layers of complexities to
the complex interventions and their evaluations, such as personal, affective and
temporal complexities.
Conclusion
In this paper, we reported on a twofold exercise: we conducted an analysis of
documents writing about (conducting) evaluation studies of complex interven-
tions, and we analysed six evaluation studies to investigate the issues and dilem-
mas encountered there. Regarding the documentary analysis, we asked: What
(notions of) complexities underlie and are significant for different means of eval-
uating complex interventions? We evidenced different ways of approaching and
performing complexity. Evaluation studies can see complexity in terms of quan-
tifying information, such as the MRC-framework tends to do; they can regard
complexity as that which escapes quantities such as in realist reviews; or they
see evaluations as intrinsically political, and thus as part of the intervention
itself, in which complexity emerges as the outcome of this entanglement of inter-
vention and evaluation (and the wider political/policy context) and ‘complexifica-
tion’ might itself be a research strategy.
These different forms of complexity appeared too in our study of actual evalu-
ation practices. This analysis also addressed the matter of what varieties of com-
plexity seem to structure and be salient to different modes of evaluation, as well as
speaking directly to our second research question: What issues are salient for
actors involved in the evaluation process, and at what point(s)? People involved
in commissioning and conducting evaluations seem to orientate their discourse
and actions in ways that involve engagement with (including acts to limit) all
these forms of complexity, no matter the design they chose. Different strategies
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were employed by our various participants in terms of the strategies they
employed to deal with specific issues. To varying degrees, evaluators and commis-
sioners seemed to simultaneously rely on different, sometimes contradicting,
repertoires about what it means to conduct a ‘good’ evaluation, mixing together
different design elements. While the design was to some extent decided upon at
the start of an evaluation study, the discussion of how to evaluate a programme
was ongoing, between and among commissioners and researchers and, at times,
programme managers (in part as a consequence of what was happening in the
programmes).
Precisely because of the ongoing and changeable nature of improvement pro-
grammes and evaluation studies, we used the Foucauldian notion of problematisa-
tion to investigate the way people involved in evaluation studies defined specific
problems and solutions to certain issues throughout the study. In particular, they
problematised evaluability, usefulness and distance/independence in different
ways and with diverse consequences. These problematisations were interwoven
with ontological and epistemological notions of complexity, as all problematisa-
tions implicitly or explicitly addressed what complexity is in (evaluating) complex
interventions and how to best capture or deal with this. In turn, these problemati-
sations produced other notions and layers of complexity, in addition to those com-
plexities locatable within the literature (either by the authors, or by us). In
particular, conflicting goals, emotions and temporalities constituted new forms
of complexity that had to be addressed in evaluation studies, in which evaluators,
programme managers and commissioners all played different roles. These
included temporal, institutional and affective complexities.
While we do not suggest that the complexities documented here are necessarily
generalisable to other evaluation studies of complex interventions, or that there are
no other notions and layers of complexity at stake in such evaluation studies, we
hope that our analysis opens up the concept of complexity to more detailed analy-
sis. As well, assuming an evaluator’s ontological and epistemological positions
solely on the basis of what design they choose—which might be done when
solely reading evaluation literature, and refraining from communication with eva-
luators, as many scholars writing about evaluations of complex interventions have
done (see for an exception: Salisbury et al., 2011)—is problematic, in terms of
how social scientists then represent this community, and seek to intervene in
their debates and practice (see, relatedly, Broer and Pickersgill, 2015). There is,
in effect, the risk of a kind of methodological determinism (Law, 2008).
Indeed, we would suggest that in the evaluation literature itself there is a need
to deal more candidly and seriously with the practical experiences of evaluators.
Let us continue in this more normative register. Both in the literature we ana-
lysed and in the actual evaluation studies we investigated, effectiveness is still
predominantly defined in quantitative terms, related to experimental designs
(cf. Schouten et al., 2008). Qualitative methods give insight into how interventions
work, but when it comes to conclusive evidence concerning whether they work,
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most authors argue that evaluators need to use experimental designs. However,
this is a rather narrow way of defining effectiveness. Evaluation methods like
realist evaluation and formative evaluations may provide insight into what the
outcomes of an intervention are for various groups, and may also play a role in
redefining effectiveness (Zuiderent-Jerak et al., 2009). This, however, can only
be done when complexity is not reduced to only that which can be quantified,
as for example the MRC tends to do.
That is not to say that quantification in itself is unwarranted, or does not suffi-
ciently address the complexities of the programmes. Quantification can attune
researchers to different kinds of complexities that would not be taken into
account in more qualitative analyses. When realist evaluators or other social
science researchers claim that one method or another is better able to grasp com-
plexity (Cohn et al., 2013), they elide the possibility that making a choice to use
one paradigm over another emphasises some complexities and lets others fade into
the background. Realising that there is no such a thing as one kind of complexity
constitutive of and produced through an intervention might liberate researchers in
thinking about and carrying out evaluation studies. Each form of complexity has
its own consequences, and therefore using a specific definition of complexity
(including leaving its definition open) is not an innocent choice that can be justi-
fied by pointing to the intervention itself. Rather, it is a choice with methodologi-
cal, normative and political components and consequences (cf. Mol, 2002).
While Mol and Law’s (2002) writing on complexities (as well as that of
Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010) is a useful reminder to postpone judgments as to
what complexity is, their notion of complexity is not analytically-privileged
either. Indeed, Mol and Law’s understanding of complexity—that is, as mess
that we should regard as (but is not necessarily) undefinable—accords with
some biomedical actors’ own ‘complex’ accounts of this notion. This, we
suggest, raises wider questions about the extent to which social scientists (like our-
selves) might productively co-theorise with scientists and other actors about their
terms of art (see, relatedly, Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014), as opposed to figuring
the former community as necessarily having epistemological priority regarding
the conceptualisation of biomedical concepts. This would also mean paying
close attention to the temporal, affective and practical complexities involved in
actual evaluation studies, an analysis that would get lost (or at least be less
rich) were we to restrict the status of complexity to only being an actor’s, and
not an analyst’s, category (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2010). Complexity is compli-
cated, after all.
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Notes
1While we draw mostly on STS-literatures in this article, we are aware that complexity is used in
other disciplines as well. For example, it is a concept used in the natural sciences in order to
grasp chaos and complexity in the physical world, including any observer effects on knowledge
production (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). It is also a concept used within theories on ‘self-
organizing systems’, as for example used by Clark (1997) to theorise the relationship
between the brain, the body and the outside world. This is probably not coincidental, and in
fact might be related to a (anti-)grand narrative within contemporary society relating to com-
plexity (where everything is seen as complex). However, in this paper we refrain from any com-
parisons outside of the subject matter we studied. Exactly because ontologies of complexity can
be (and probably are) different across disciplines and therefore the interrelated practices of
treating complexity as well (cf. Smith, 2005), arguing for a resemblance, we feel, would under-
mine our analysis of specific (and at times rather mundane) practices.
2Further, we are also aware that as social scientists participating in the healthcare field, our own
exposure to—and accumulation of—different kinds of capital in this realm has implications for
our epistemic innocence when it comes to collecting and interpreting the data presented here (cf.
Pickersgill, 2016).
3Whereas ZonMw had commissioned national quality programmes and campaigns before, the
programmes discussed here were among the first to include a formal evaluation running along-
side the programme. Earlier programmes had been evaluated post hoc.
4We would like to thank Kor Grit for helping us to articulate this argument.
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